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BUSINESS INTERESTS AND THE LONG ARM IN 2011
Paul D. Carrington*
I share the perception expressed by Professor Miller that the Supreme Court
has been captured by the Chamber of Commerce.1 That sense of direction was
manifested in its unanimous and correct decision to constrain the state of North
Carolina in the case of Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
2 and
in a perverse way, by the Court's incorrect decision to prevent the enforcement
of New Jersey law in the case of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.3
The purpose of special long-arm jurisdiction, as established in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,4 was to enable state governments to enforce their laws,
especially those laws regulating or imposing costs on firms seeking to benefit
from the marketplace located within the state.5 That constitutional purpose can
be said to reflect the wisdom of Adam Smith, who, before he proclaimed the
economic advantages of open markets, 6 observed that moral constraints on
human behavior depend on a measure of proximity or personal connection with
the persons affected by our conduct.7 On that account, we understand that
business firms have little sense of moral responsibility to the citizens of distant
states or for the observance of the laws of distant states. And states seldom enact
and enforce laws made to protect distant citizens of other states or nations at the
expense of their local citizens or firms. Therefore, a state cannot rely on the law
or the officers of a distant state to protect its citizens from risky or harmful
decisions by business executives in that distant state.
The Goodyear case provides a stellar example of the appropriate limits of
8
long-arm jurisdiction. North Carolina has no business regulating tire safety on
French buses.9 France may depend primarily on instruments other than tort
liability to encourage the use of safe tires on French buses and to address the
*Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REv.
465 (2012); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 375,
389 (2010) ("One way of interpreting these decisions, and others like them, is that the conservative
justices are simply pro-business and pro-prosecutor and are denying access to the courts to
consumers, employees, and criminal defendants. This certainly explains the rulings." (footnote
omitted)).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. See id. at 319.
6. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford World's Classics 1998) (1776).
7. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 134-37 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., Oxford University Press 1979) (1759).
8. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
9. See id.
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costs of accidents.' 0 Ordinary French bus passengers suing in a French court
have a more limited right to hire a lawyer on a contingent fee," have no right to
conduct discovery,12 and if they lose, may have to pay the defendants' legal
expenses.' 3 Further, North Carolina has no legislative jurisdiction to regulate the
cost or safety of bus travel in France. If North Carolina is to exercise such
legislative responsibility to protect North Carolinians on French buses by
imposing North Carolina tort law and civil procedure, then the price of the bus
ticket should be a bit higher for North Carolinians than for their fellow French
passengers. Partly because that is obviously not feasible, the Court was
absolutely right in its unanimous decision to protect a foreign firm from the
application and enforcement of North Carolina law that was not substantively
applicable to the event giving rise to the case.
14
But New Jersey clearly needs, and relies upon, twentieth century special
long-arm jurisdiction to regulate the safety of workplaces in that state. In the
United States, we rely primarily on tort law to deter business practices that
impose costs and risks on workers, consumers, and their environment.' 6 For that
10. See generally David Corb6-Chalon & Martin A. Rogoff, Tort Reform A la Franqaise:
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspectives on Damages for Bodily Injury in France, 13 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 231, 235 (2007) (noting the differences between the American and French systems for
calculating personal injury damages).
11. Contingent fees are not unknown in France, but would generally not be used in a personal
injury case. See Richard W. Hulbert, Comment on French Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L.
747, 748 (1997) ("A plaintiff cannot engage a French [attorney] on a purely contingent fee basis.").
But see HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 259 tbl.8.1 (2004) ("Major Paris law firms are using contingency
fees increasingly as well as being permitted to base fees in part on results achieved." (internal
citations omitted)); Otto Sandrock, The Choice Between Forum Selection, Mediation and
Arbitration Clauses: European Perspectives, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 7, 26 (2009) ("Contingency
fees are also allowed within certain limits.").
12. Hulbert, supra note 11, at 751 ("[A]merican procedure offers wide
investigative/discovery techniques in a civil case .... These have no counterparts in the French
practice."); see also PETER E. HERZOG WITH MARTHA WESER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 233
(Hans Smit ed., 1967) ("Discovery of papers and tangible evidence in the hands of an adverse party
is possible only in very limited cases."); cf. Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of
Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1015 (2009) (citing James Q. Whitman, The
Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1156 (2004))
("European laws are very protective of personal privacy in many areas, from consumer rights ... to
discovery in civil litigation.").
13. Sandrock, supra note 11, at 26 (citing NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE
[N.C.P.C.] art. 700 (Fr.)) ("Unlike the situation in Germany, there is no strict rule on the distribution
of the fees and expenses for the winners and losers of court proceedings. Instead, Article 700 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that the judge must rule on the amount which the loser will have
to pay the winner, taking into account equity and the loser's economic situation. The judge can also
decide that there will be no reimbursement at all of costs and expenses." (footnote omitted)).
14. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855.
15. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 589 (N.J. 2010), rev'd sub
nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
16. See CARL BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED
DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 2 (2001). For insightful comment, see also
[VOL. 63: 637
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reason, we provide tort plaintiffs with contingent fee lawyers, 17 discovery,' 8 the
American Rule on the allocation of costs, 19 and long-arm jurisdiction enabling
states to impose liability on those creating risks of harm to citizens within their
jurisdiction. In contrast, France and England may rely heavily on
administrative regulation of business practices. 2' In either of those nations, the
machine causing the harm in New Jersey might have been subject to closer
inspection by officials, and the firms involved in their sale and use would almost
certainly have paid higher taxes to fund the regulatory process and to provide
health care for the injured worker.
The protection of workers in New Jersey is a concern, indeed a duty, of the
New Jersey government. As the legendary Adam Smith observed, no one in a
foreign country is deeply concerned about the consequences to a New Jersey
22worker of an avoidable accident. But local competitors of the British
manufacturer, in New Jersey or other states, are burdened by that concern
because of the applicability of New Jersey tort law. There are numerous Justices
of the Supreme Court who have manifested displeasure with American tort law
imposing risks and costs on those citizens engaged in commerce,23 and in
John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the
Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 263-67 (2007) (discussing how the
plaintiffs bar has affected the American tort system).
17. See SUNG-HO J. AHN, LITIGIOUSNESS, CONTRACT DESIGN AND THE ECONOMIC
MOTIVES OF THE CONTINGENT FEE LAWYER 1 (1998) (citing JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M.
PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 37-
38 (1986), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R3391.pdf); LESTER BRICKMAN,
LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST AMERICA 254 (2011);
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.4.1, at 526-31 (1986); Patricia Munch
Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation, 14 BELL J. ECON. 213, 213 (1983); Witt,
supra note 16, at 266 ("With the help of the contingent fee, the gladiator-for-hire might be
converted to the service of the wronged individual."); Herbert M. Kritzer, Rhetoric and
Reality... Uses and Abuses... Contingencies and Certainties: The American Contingent Fee in
Operation 55 (Inst. for Legal Studies, Disputes Processing Research Program, Working Paper No.
12-2, 1996).
18. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37 & 45 (describing the procedures for discovery).
19. ALAN J. TOMKINS & THOMAS E. WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES:
PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL COURTS 49 (1986) (explaining the American
Rule of parties paying only their own litigation costs); see also Werner Pfennigstorf, The European
Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 39 (1984) (discussing
whether the American Rule is "encouraging the 'right' types of litigation").
20. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 40 (2010); see also Erin F.
Norris, Note, Why the Internet Isn't Special: Restoring Predictability to Personal Jurisdiction, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2011) (explaining that courts expanded the doctrine of long-arm
jurisdiction in the mid-twentieth century "because technology [had] made it possible to cause injury
in a state yet avoid being subject to jurisdiction in that state").
21. See, e.g., L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 26-27
(5th ed. 1998) (noting the wide array of industries that French administrative law regulates).
22. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 135-37.
23. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1080 (2011) ("The vaccine
manufacturers fund from their sales an informal, efficient compensation program for vaccine
injuries; in exchange they avoid costly tort litigation and the occasional disproportionate jury
3
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McIntyre, they seized an opportunity to deny the power of New Jersey to enforce
its tort law against an alleged offender.
24
But, alas, I am not so sure that the United States Chamber of Commerce
approves of the result in McIntyre. Consider that decision from the vantage of
an American firm manufacturing a competing product. A firm making the
machine in Ohio would have to assess the costs associated with the risks to
workers when it ships a three ton tool with a big blade into New Jersey. That
firm perhaps pays, as a cost of its business, a liability insurance premium that is
assessed to cover that risk. Perhaps the Chamber of Commerce would therefore
be concerned that the Court's decision gives a competitive advantage to foreign
firms seeking to sell their machines in the United States.
Does the Constitution of the United States tell the Supreme Court to give
such an advantage to a foreign competitor? I cannot read its text that way. To
be sure, if the three ton machine just happened in some unlikely way to find its
way from England to New Jersey, its innocent English manufacturer should not
be burdened with the unfortunate consequences occurring in New Jersey. But,
the proven facts suggest otherwise. True, the plaintiff did not conduct extensive
and expensive discovery to expose all the details of McIntyre's efforts and
expectations regarding the sale of its machine in New Jersey. It is remotely
possible that McIntyre had no intention to profit from the New Jersey market for
its machine. And perhaps it was blissfully unaware that it was exposing a New
Jersey worker to serious risk. But, somehow, those possibilities seem very
unlikely. The burden should be placed on a manufacturer of a large, dangerous
product that finds its way into New Jersey and causes harm, to present evidence
demonstrating that it, with reason, did not anticipate any risk befalling a citizen
of that state as a consequence of its business practices. There is an ancient Latin
phrase to be invoked: res ipsa loquitur.26 The facts speak for themselves.
To invoke the absence of personal jurisdiction over a foreign "citizen" such
27as the McIntyre firm, the duty should have been imposed on the prospering
defendant to show that its gain was not associated with any foreseeable risk of
harm to a New Jersey worker. In failing to impose such a duty, the Supreme
Court of the United States negligently denied to the sovereign state of New
Jersey the right and responsibility to enforce its laws even-handedly against
verdict." (footnotes omitted)); Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651,
663 (2006) (noting that workers' compensation statutes "remove the risk of large judgments and
heavy costs generated by tort litigation" for employers); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Freeman Ayers,
538 U.S. 135, 186-87 (2003) (Breyer, J.. concurring) (criticizing current tort law compensation
methods and noting that several Supreme Court Justices have called upon Congress to respond to
the problem).
24. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opinion).
25. See id. at 2790 (explaining that Nicastro failed to prove purposeful availment through
discovery).
26. See Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Ex. 1863) (finding that "[t]here are certain
cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur").
27. The McIntyre firm is an English corporation. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
[VOL. 63: 637
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S 28foreign firms as well as against their domestic competitors. Surely, the
Constitution does not forbid the states to regulate foreign corporations or citizens
in the same manner and by the same method of private law enforcement that it
employs to regulate domestic firms.
The McIntyre case was thus wrongly decided. And the decision seems to
this reader to reflect an irresistible impulse of numerous Justices to protect
Business from tort claims. Even foreign Business competing in our domestic
markets!
28. See id. at 2791.
2012]
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